Constitutional Rights Violations: Federal Court Is Not Always the Right Move
Published .
When a police officer makes an unlawful arrest, uses excessive force, conducts an unconstitutional search, a correctional institution fails to protect an inmate, or a governmental employee otherwise violates an individual’s constitutional rights, lawyers frequently make an almost automatic association:
Constitutional violation. Section 1983. Federal court.
The first two thoughts may be correct.
The third does not necessarily follow.
A federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not have to be filed initially in federal court. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. More importantly for Maryland practitioners, Maryland has its own constitutional tort jurisprudence, including direct damages actions for violations of provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Those Maryland claims are not simply state-law copies of § 1983.
In several important respects, Maryland constitutional tort law differs significantly from federal § 1983 law. Among the differences are qualified immunity, respondeat superior liability of local governmental entities, and Maryland’s recognition of direct local-government liability for an unconstitutional pattern or practice.
At the same time, Maryland constitutional claims are not automatically easier to prove. A plaintiff must still establish an underlying constitutional violation, and in some circumstances Maryland courts look to analogous federal constitutional standards in defining the substantive right.
The forum and causes of action therefore should be selected deliberately.
The existence of a constitutional violation answers one question.
It does not answer which constitutional cause of action should be pleaded, which defendants should be sued, or where the lawsuit should ultimately be litigated.
Section 1983 Is a Remedy, Not the Constitution
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a civil cause of action against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another person of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal law.
Section 1983 does not itself create the underlying constitutional right.
The plaintiff must identify the right that was violated.
Examples include:
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an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment;
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an arrest without probable cause;
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excessive force;
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unconstitutional detention;
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deprivation of liberty without due process;
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unconstitutional conditions of confinement;
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deliberate indifference to serious medical needs;
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failure to protect a prisoner from a known substantial danger;
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retaliation for protected speech; and
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interference with other rights secured by federal law or the Constitution.
Federal district courts unquestionably possess federal-question jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.
But federal jurisdiction does not mean federal court is necessarily the best forum.
A § 1983 Claim Can Be Filed in Maryland State Court
State courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 actions.
A plaintiff therefore may file a federal civil-rights claim in a Maryland circuit court.
That does not necessarily mean the case will remain there.
A defendant ordinarily may remove an action containing a § 1983 claim to the United States District Court if the statutory requirements for removal are satisfied.
That produces the first important strategic lesson:
Choosing state court and keeping a case in state court are two different things.
A lawyer who includes a § 1983 count in a Maryland complaint should consider removal before—not after—the complaint is filed.
Sometimes the Federal Claim Is What Makes the Case Removable
Suppose the same police conduct supports claims under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The plaintiff pleads:
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a Fourth Amendment violation under § 1983;
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an Article 26 Maryland constitutional tort;
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false arrest;
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false imprisonment; and
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battery.
The plaintiff files in a Maryland circuit court.
The § 1983 count supplies federal-question jurisdiction and ordinarily provides a basis for removal.
Now ask a question that sometimes receives too little attention:
What did the federal count add to this particular case, and what did pleading it cost?
If the Maryland constitutional and common-law claims provide the remedies necessary to compensate the client, pleading the federal claim may surrender substantial control over forum selection.
That does not mean the federal claim should routinely be omitted.
Section 1983 provides important remedies, including the potential recovery of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
It means the decision should be made consciously.
Maryland Has Its Own Constitutional Tort Remedy
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights protects many interests analogous to those protected by the federal Constitution.
Article 24 protects due-process and related liberty interests.
Article 26 protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and generally corresponds to the Fourth Amendment.
Other provisions of the Declaration of Rights may also provide civil remedies depending upon the right and circumstances involved.
Maryland recognizes damages actions for violations of these protections as constitutional torts.
Important decisions include Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995); DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 729 A.2d 354 (1999); Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 757 A.2d 118 (2000); and Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859 (2011).
Together, these cases establish an important proposition:
Maryland constitutional tort law is not simply § 1983 with Maryland article numbers substituted for federal amendment numbers.
DiPino v. Davis: Maryland Chose a Different Remedial Path
DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 729 A.2d 354 (1999), is fundamental to understanding the distinction.
Federal constitutional damages claims against state and local officials ordinarily proceed through the statutory remedy supplied by § 1983.
Maryland constitutional violations are redressed through Maryland’s own constitutional tort jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court of Maryland declined simply to import all federal § 1983 remedial restrictions into Maryland constitutional law.
That distinction has important consequences.
Qualified Immunity: One of the Most Important Differences
Federal qualified immunity can dominate § 1983 litigation against individual governmental officials.
Depending upon the defendant and constitutional claim, the litigation may concern not only whether a constitutional violation occurred but whether the federal right was sufficiently established under the governing qualified-immunity jurisprudence.
Maryland constitutional tort law is different.
Maryland common-law public-official qualified immunity does not shield a public official from liability for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
In Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 201, 757 A.2d 118 (2000), the Court stated that a public official alleged to have violated Article 24—or another provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights—is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Longtin reiterated that Maryland principle and emphasized the divergence between Maryland constitutional remedies and § 1983.
That can make a Maryland constitutional claim extremely important even where the federal and Maryland constitutional provisions protect substantially similar interests.
The Governmental Employer: An Even Greater Difference
Federal law erects another substantial obstacle when the plaintiff seeks to hold a municipality responsible under § 1983.
Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a local government cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because it employed the officer who committed the constitutional violation.
There is no ordinary respondeat superior municipal liability under § 1983.
It is not enough to prove:
The officer violated the Constitution + the county employed the officer = county liability.
The plaintiff ordinarily must connect the constitutional deprivation to governmental policy, custom, practice, an appropriate policymaker’s decision, a qualifying failure to train or supervise, or another recognized basis for Monell liability.
Maryland constitutional tort law took a different path.
DiPino: Respondeat Superior for Maryland Constitutional Torts
DiPino recognizes local-government responsibility under respondeat superior principles for Maryland constitutional torts committed by employees within the scope of employment.
That is a profound difference from Monell.
If a local police officer commits a Maryland constitutional tort within the scope of employment, the local governmental entity may be responsible even though the employment relationship alone could not establish § 1983 municipal liability.
The distinction is practical, not academic.
In some cases, the Maryland constitutional claim may provide a substantially more direct route to local-government liability than a federal Monell claim.
Prince George’s County v. Longtin: Maryland Went Further
Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859 (2011), is one of Maryland’s most important constitutional-tort decisions.
Keith Longtin reported his wife missing and became the focus of the police investigation into her rape and murder.
He was subjected to more than 36 hours of interrogation, arrested and charged. He then remained incarcerated for more than eight months. During that period, police obtained exculpatory evidence. Ultimately, DNA evidence implicated another man and Longtin was released.
Longtin sued Prince George’s County and individual officers.
A jury returned a substantial verdict in his favor.
The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed and, importantly, recognized a cause of action against a local government based upon an unconstitutional pattern or practice. The Court held that a local government may be liable when its policies and procedures have the effect of causing employees to engage in unconstitutional conduct.
A Longtin Claim Is Not Simply a Maryland Monell Claim
There are obvious similarities between Longtin and Monell.
Both may require examination of institutional practices rather than treating the constitutional violation as an isolated act.
But the Maryland Supreme Court has expressly emphasized that Maryland constitutional remedies do not simply incorporate federal § 1983 restrictions.
Maryland law therefore potentially provides two different avenues to local-government responsibility:
Derivative liability based upon a governmental employee’s Maryland constitutional tort committed within the scope of employment; and
Direct liability for the local government’s own unconstitutional pattern or practice.
Federal § 1983 law does not provide that same combination because Monell rejects ordinary respondeat superior municipal liability.
What Can Establish a Pattern or Practice?
A single unconstitutional incident does not ordinarily prove an institutional pattern or practice.
Relevant evidence may include:
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repeated similar incidents;
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prior complaints;
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internal-affairs investigations;
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inadequate investigation of recurring misconduct;
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repeated failures to discipline;
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training deficiencies;
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supervisory knowledge of recurring violations;
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tolerance of unconstitutional practices;
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informal practices inconsistent with written policies;
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prior similar lawsuits;
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internal communications;
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statistical or historical evidence where appropriate; and
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institutional failure to correct known recurring constitutional violations.
A Longtin claim can therefore dramatically expand discovery.
The lawsuit is no longer concerned exclusively with:
What happened to this plaintiff?
It may also ask:
What has this governmental agency done to other people, who knew about it, and what did the government do in response?
Unrelated Incidents May Become Relevant
Longtin itself demonstrates this consequence.
Evidence concerning an interrogation of another, unrelated criminal defendant was admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the alleged pattern or practice. The Supreme Court upheld the recognition of Maryland pattern-or-practice liability.
That can make institutional discovery enormously important.
It can also make the case enormously expensive.
A Longtin theory therefore should not simply be appended to every police-misconduct complaint. Counsel should have a factual basis for believing an institutional problem exists and should consider whether the anticipated discovery is proportional to the case.
Gelin v. Baltimore County: A Recent Warning About the Federal Route
The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in Gelin v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 132 F.4th 700 (4th Cir. 2025), provides an unusually useful Maryland example of why federal and state theories should be evaluated separately before assuming that a constitutional case necessarily belongs in federal court.
Ashleigh Gelin was serving a one-year sentence at the Baltimore County Detention Center.
She suffered from bipolar disorder and was taking three medications daily to control it.
According to the allegations, the detention center cut off her access to those medications. Her mental illness went untreated despite institutional policy.
Ten days after entering the facility, she died by suicide.
Her parents, individually and as personal representatives of her Estate, sued Baltimore County and various correctional and medical personnel.
The litigation included federal constitutional claims under § 1983, Maryland constitutional claims, and Maryland tort claims.
The Federal Constitutional Standard Mattered
Because Gelin was a sentenced prisoner, the federal constitutional claim was analyzed under the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference standard.
The allegations included failures by correctional officers to conduct required watch-tour rounds and failures to respond while other inmates screamed and banged on cell walls attempting to summon assistance.
Those allegations described an unquestionably serious event.
But seriousness of the event was not enough.
The federal constitutional claim required allegations sufficient to establish the particular state of mind demanded by Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference jurisprudence.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the allegations did not adequately establish that the individual correctional officers possessed the requisite subjective knowledge of a substantial risk to Gelin and deliberately disregarded it.
The federal claims therefore failed. Gelin, 132 F.4th at 709–13.
Negligence, Gross Negligence, and Constitutional Deliberate Indifference Are Different Things
This is one of Gelin‘s most useful lessons.
Conduct can be negligent without being unconstitutional.
Conduct may potentially be grossly negligent without satisfying the federal constitutional standard for deliberate indifference.
Violation of a jail policy does not automatically establish a constitutional violation.
Failure to conduct a required inmate check does not, by itself, establish that the officer actually knew of and deliberately disregarded the constitutionally significant risk required by the applicable federal standard.
That distinction can become decisive in jail-suicide, failure-to-protect, and inadequate-medical-care litigation.
A catastrophic result does not collapse tort law and constitutional law into the same cause of action.
The Maryland Constitutional Claim in Gelin
The plaintiffs also asserted a claim under Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The Fourth Circuit addressed that claim together with the corresponding federal theory and rejected it on the issues before the court.
That provides an important qualification to the broader discussion of Maryland constitutional remedies.
Maryland remedial law can be more favorable than federal § 1983 law in significant respects.
But a more favorable remedy does not eliminate the need to establish an underlying constitutional violation.
A plaintiff cannot convert conduct that is merely negligent into unconstitutional conduct simply by replacing a federal constitutional citation with a Maryland Declaration of Rights provision.
Baltimore County’s Governmental Immunity Created Another Distinction
The Gelin plaintiffs also pursued a Maryland common-law negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim against Baltimore County.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Baltimore County possessed Maryland governmental immunity from that claim because operation of the detention center constituted a governmental function.
This illustrates why causes of action against governmental entities must be analyzed individually.
The fact that a county may be responsible for certain Maryland constitutional torts does not mean that governmental immunity disappears for ordinary common-law negligence claims arising from governmental functions.
Thus:
constitutional tort liability is not ordinary negligence liability.
The distinction can determine whether the governmental entity remains in the case.
Then the Federal Claims Disappeared
Perhaps the most instructive aspect of Gelin for forum-selection purposes occurred after the Fourth Circuit disposed of the federal claims.
There was no complete diversity of citizenship.
What remained were Maryland claims.
The Fourth Circuit remanded so that the District Court could determine whether it should continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over those remaining state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Gelin, 132 F.4th at 716.
The District of Maryland then declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction.
On April 21, 2025, the court dismissed the surviving Maryland claims without prejudice so they could be pursued in the appropriate state forum.
Think About What Happened in Gelin
The procedural history deserves consideration apart from the substantive holdings.
The litigation began in 2016.
There were extensive proceedings in federal district court and appellate proceedings in the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit’s published decision came in 2025.
The federal constitutional claims ultimately failed.
The federal court then declined to decide the surviving Maryland claims.
After years of federal litigation, the remaining controversy was sent back toward the state-law forum.
That does not establish that the original lawyers were wrong to plead federal constitutional claims.
It demonstrates something more useful:
The decision to plead a federal constitutional claim can have enormous procedural consequences even when the claim ultimately disappears from the case.
The Questions Gelin Suggests Asking Before Filing
In a constitutional tort case, counsel should ask at the beginning:
What must I prove under § 1983 that I would not have to prove under my Maryland tort theories?
Does qualified immunity materially threaten the federal claim?
Does Maryland constitutional law provide a viable alternative?
Does the governmental defendant have common-law immunity from an ordinary tort theory?
What happens to the Maryland claims if the federal constitutional claims are dismissed?
Will the federal court retain supplemental jurisdiction?
If it does not, how many years might pass before the surviving claims reach state court?
Those are forum questions, but they are also case-value questions.
Time and litigation expense affect clients.
Federal Court May Be the Right Forum
None of this means federal court should be avoided.
There are many cases in which it is entirely appropriate.
A substantial federal constitutional question may dominate the litigation.
The case may depend heavily upon federal precedent.
Federal procedural rules may suit the litigation.
The federal court may provide advantages in case management or discovery.
And § 1983 carries an enormously important potential benefit: prevailing plaintiffs may seek reasonable attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
That can be particularly important when the constitutional violation is significant but compensatory damages are modest.
Federal Court Can Also Bring Additional Obstacles
Depending upon the case, federal litigation can include:
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qualified-immunity motion practice;
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the demanding requirements for municipal liability under Monell;
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substantial dispositive-motion practice;
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bifurcation of individual and municipal claims;
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sequencing or limitation of institutional discovery;
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interlocutory appellate proceedings concerning qualified immunity in appropriate cases;
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litigation over supplemental jurisdiction; and
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eventual return of surviving Maryland claims to state court.
None of those factors automatically makes federal court undesirable.
But all should be considered before the complaint determines the battlefield.
Qualified Immunity Can Affect the Timing of the Entire Case
Federal qualified immunity is not merely a defense to ultimate liability.
Because the doctrine is intended in appropriate cases to protect governmental officials from the burdens of litigation itself, a denial of qualified immunity may sometimes produce an interlocutory appeal.
That can interrupt the underlying litigation before trial.
Maryland constitutional tort claims do not simply reproduce the federal qualified-immunity structure.
The difference may matter greatly in a case in which individual governmental defendants are central.
Maryland Constitutional Claims Are Not Automatically Easy Claims
The absence of federal qualified immunity does not mean that an Article 24 or Article 26 claim automatically succeeds.
The plaintiff still must establish a constitutional violation.
Article 26 and Fourth Amendment principles frequently travel together. If a search or seizure was constitutionally reasonable, changing the heading from “Fourth Amendment” to “Article 26” does not manufacture liability.
Likewise, Maryland’s broader remedial principles do not turn every negligent governmental act into a constitutional tort.
Gelin is a useful reminder of that distinction.
Common-Law Claims Still Matter
Constitutional claims should not cause counsel to overlook traditional tort causes of action.
The same governmental encounter may support:
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false arrest;
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false imprisonment;
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assault;
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battery;
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malicious prosecution;
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negligence where appropriate;
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gross negligence where legally significant;
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wrongful death;
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survival claims; and
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other intentional or negligence-based tort theories.
Each has its own elements, defenses, privileges, immunities, limitations rules, and damages consequences.
The strongest complaint is not necessarily the complaint with the most counts.
The LGTCA Must Be Analyzed Separately
Maryland constitutional litigation against local governmental personnel does not make the Local Government Tort Claims Act irrelevant.
The LGTCA can affect notice, indemnification, execution upon judgments, damages limitations, and litigation procedure.
But it is important not to confuse the LGTCA with substantive immunity.
As Maryland courts have repeatedly explained, the LGTCA principally allocates financial responsibility between local governments and their employees; it does not itself create a cause of action.
The lawyer should therefore separately determine:
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whether the employee is liable;
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whether the local government has direct liability;
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whether the local government must indemnify;
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whether actual malice affects execution against the employee;
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whether governmental immunity protects the entity from a particular direct common-law claim; and
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whether Maryland constitutional law creates a different basis of governmental responsibility.
State Personnel Require a Different Analysis
The same analysis cannot simply be transferred to the State of Maryland.
The Maryland Tort Claims Act, sovereign immunity, statutory immunity of State personnel, and the distinction between claims against the State and claims against individual State employees require separate examination.
Likewise, Longtin should not automatically be treated as authorizing every pattern-or-practice theory against every governmental entity.
Always identify which government is involved before selecting the theory.
Notice Problems Can Destroy Otherwise Valuable Claims
Constitutional litigation can focus so much attention upon governmental misconduct that procedural requirements receive inadequate attention.
That can be disastrous.
Potential notice requirements should be investigated when the client first appears.
Counsel should identify:
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who employed each defendant;
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whether the defendant is State or local personnel;
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what governmental entity may bear responsibility;
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what notice provisions apply;
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when each claim accrued;
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whether substantial compliance is available;
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whether good cause may excuse a defect; and
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whether different claims carry different procedural requirements.
Attorney’s Fees Can Change the Forum Calculation
Section 1988 is an important reason not to omit § 1983 casually.
A prevailing plaintiff in qualifying federal civil-rights litigation may recover reasonable attorney’s fees.
That can make constitutional litigation economically possible where compensatory damages alone would not justify the enormous expense involved.
A purely Maryland constitutional tort claim does not automatically provide the same federal statutory fee remedy.
Thus, omitting the federal claim merely to attempt to prevent removal can have a substantial cost.
Forum selection involves tradeoffs.
Damages Should Be Considered Before Selecting the Claims
Counsel should ask what the lawsuit actually needs to accomplish.
Is this primarily a catastrophic personal-injury or wrongful-death case?
Is the principal injury wrongful incarceration?
Are economic damages substantial?
Are compensatory damages relatively modest but the constitutional violation significant?
Is injunctive relief important?
Are punitive damages potentially available against an individual defendant?
Is recovery against the governmental entity essential?
Will attorney’s fees determine whether the litigation is economically feasible?
Those questions may change which causes of action matter most.
The Complaint Can Determine the Battlefield
Consider an unlawful-arrest case against a county police officer.
Complaint A
The plaintiff alleges:
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Fourth Amendment violation under § 1983;
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§ 1983 claim against the county under Monell;
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Article 24 violation;
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Article 26 violation;
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false arrest;
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false imprisonment; and
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battery.
The case is filed in Maryland circuit court.
The federal claims provide a path to removal. Once removed, the plaintiff may face federal qualified-immunity litigation against the officer and Monell requirements against the county.
Complaint B
Assume the facts and governing law legitimately permit proceeding solely under Maryland law.
The plaintiff alleges:
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Article 24;
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Article 26;
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false arrest;
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false imprisonment; and
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battery.
There is no federal cause of action on the face of the complaint.
That can materially change the federal-question removal analysis.
But Complaint B may sacrifice § 1988 attorney’s fees and other advantages associated with § 1983.
Neither complaint is universally superior.
The important point is that the choice should be intentional.
Do Not Plead § 1983 Reflexively
Section 1983 is one of the most important civil-rights remedies in American law.
But familiarity can become a trap.
A lawyer sees unconstitutional governmental conduct, inserts a § 1983 count, files in circuit court, and only after receiving the notice of removal begins thinking seriously about forum.
By then, one of the most important strategic decisions may already have been made.
Before including the federal count, ask:
What does § 1983 give this client that Maryland constitutional law does not?
Then ask:
What defenses, procedural consequences, and jurisdictional consequences accompany it?
Do Not Omit § 1983 Reflexively Either
The opposite mistake can be equally serious.
Learning that Maryland constitutional law avoids some federal obstacles does not mean § 1983 should routinely be omitted.
Doing so can sacrifice:
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§ 1988 attorney’s fees;
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valuable federal causes of action;
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federal injunctive remedies;
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established federal constitutional precedent;
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strategic procedural advantages; and
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remedies against defendants for whom Maryland law may not provide an equivalent alternative.
The lesson is not:
Stay out of federal court.
It is:
Know why you are going there.
Removal Should Be Part of the Initial Case Evaluation
Removal should be considered during initial case evaluation.
Counsel should determine:
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whether federal claims are essential;
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whether another basis for federal jurisdiction exists;
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which defendants may remove;
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whether procedural requirements for removal can be met;
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whether amendments could later create federal jurisdiction;
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what happens if the federal claims are dismissed;
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whether the federal court is likely to retain supplemental jurisdiction; and
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whether returning to state court years later would materially prejudice the client’s practical interests.
Gelin demonstrates that the last question is not theoretical.
Discovery May Differ Dramatically in a Monell or Longtin Case
Institutional constitutional claims can transform discovery.
A plaintiff may seek years of:
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internal-affairs files;
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citizen complaints;
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use-of-force reports;
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arrest and detention records;
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disciplinary records;
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training materials;
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policies and general orders;
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supervisory communications;
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prior lawsuits;
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investigative reports;
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accreditation materials;
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statistical evidence; and
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electronic communications.
The government may respond with objections based upon relevance, proportionality, privilege, confidentiality, personnel protections, or other grounds.
Before pleading an institutional theory, counsel should ask whether the case justifies the discovery necessary to prove it.
An unsupported pattern-or-practice count can become an expensive distraction.
A well-supported one can fundamentally change the case.
Think About Proof Before Drafting Counts
The strongest constitutional complaints are built backward from proof.
For each proposed count, ask:
What exactly must be proved?
Against whom?
What immunity applies?
Who ultimately pays the judgment?
What evidence establishes the claim?
What discovery will be necessary?
Can the governmental entity be liable derivatively?
Must a governmental policy or practice be proved?
Are attorney’s fees available?
Does pleading this count create federal jurisdiction?
What happens to the rest of the case if this count is dismissed?
Those questions are more useful than asking how many constitutional theories can be inserted into a complaint.
State Court Is Not a Second-Class Forum for Constitutional Rights
Constitutional litigation is not exclusively federal litigation.
Maryland courts enforce the United States Constitution.
They also enforce Maryland’s Declaration of Rights.
And Maryland has deliberately developed constitutional-tort remedies that do not invariably mirror the remedial restrictions federal courts apply under § 1983.
As the Supreme Court of Maryland explained in Longtin, Maryland constitutional protections and remedies diverge in significant respects from federal § 1983 doctrine.
That difference can matter enormously to an injured plaintiff.
Bottom Line
A constitutional violation does not automatically mean that a lawsuit belongs in federal court.
Before filing, counsel should identify separately:
The right violated.
The available federal cause of action.
The available Maryland constitutional cause of action.
The appropriate defendants.
The applicable immunities.
Whether respondeat superior is available.
Whether an institutional pattern-or-practice claim is supportable.
Whether attorney’s fees are important.
Whether pleading a federal claim will permit removal.
What happens to the Maryland claims if the federal claims fail.
And which forum best serves the particular client’s case.
Section 1983 remains an extraordinarily important civil-rights remedy.
But § 1983 is a cause of action.
It is not a litigation strategy.
Sometimes federal court is precisely where a constitutional-rights case belongs.
Sometimes Maryland constitutional law supplies a more direct path to governmental liability.
Sometimes both federal and Maryland claims should be pleaded despite the likelihood of removal.
And sometimes—as the procedural history of Gelin vividly illustrates—the federal claims can consume years of litigation, disappear, and leave the surviving Maryland claims to return to the state-law forum where they might ultimately have to be resolved.
The most consequential forum decision therefore may occur before the first sentence of the complaint is written:
Which rights were violated, which claims should be pleaded, against whom, and in what court?
Related Maryland Cases and Authorities
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Gelin v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 132 F.4th 700 (4th Cir. 2025) — published Fourth Circuit decision arising from the suicide of a sentenced prisoner at the Baltimore County Detention Center. Addresses Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, Maryland constitutional claims, immunity issues, and the consequences for remaining state-law claims after the federal claims failed.
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Gelin v. Baltimore County, No. 1:16-cv-03694-ADC (D. Md. Apr. 21, 2025) — following the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the District of Maryland declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Maryland claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
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Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859 (2011) — recognizes a Maryland constitutional cause of action against a local government for an unconstitutional pattern or practice and emphasizes significant differences between Maryland constitutional remedies and federal § 1983 doctrine.
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DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 729 A.2d 354 (1999) — foundational Maryland constitutional-tort decision concerning governmental responsibility for constitutional violations committed by local governmental employees and the distinction between Maryland constitutional remedies and § 1983.
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Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 757 A.2d 118 (2000) — confirms that Maryland public-official qualified immunity does not immunize an official from liability for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
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Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995) — important Maryland constitutional-tort authority concerning governmental responsibility and damages remedies for violations of Maryland constitutional rights.
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Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988) — foundational authority concerning Maryland constitutional torts and governmental liability.
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Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 863 A.2d 297 (2004) — discusses Maryland public-official immunity and its limited application to state constitutional torts.
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Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) — establishes federal municipal liability under § 1983 while rejecting respondeat superior as a basis for municipal § 1983 liability.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 — federal statutory cause of action for deprivation of federal constitutional and statutory rights under color of state law.
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42 U.S.C. § 1988 — authorizes attorney’s-fee awards in qualifying federal civil-rights litigation.
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28 U.S.C. § 1367 — governs supplemental federal jurisdiction over related state-law claims and permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in specified circumstances.
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Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 24 — Maryland constitutional protection of due-process and related rights.
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Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 26 — Maryland constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act, Md. Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings §§ 5-301 through 5-304 — governs important aspects of claims involving local governments and their employees, including notice and indemnification.
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Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code, State Government §§ 12-101 et seq. and Courts & Judicial Proceedings § 5-522 — requires separate consideration when constitutional claims involve the State or State personnel.