Qualified Immunity: What It Is, What It Protects, and Why Maryland Constitutional Claims Are Different
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Few doctrines in civil-rights litigation generate more confusion than qualified immunity.
The phrase is frequently used as though it means:
Government employees cannot be sued for doing their jobs.
That is wrong.
It is also sometimes described as though it were a defense available whenever a police officer, correctional officer, or other public employee acted reasonably.
That description is incomplete.
Federal qualified immunity is a specialized doctrine protecting governmental officials performing discretionary functions from personal liability under federal civil-rights law unless their conduct violated a federal constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.
The doctrine can defeat a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim even where a court concludes that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.
And because qualified immunity is intended to protect officials not merely from liability but from the burdens of litigation, the doctrine can affect discovery, summary judgment, trial, and even the timing of an appeal.
For Maryland practitioners, however, there is an additional and extremely important point:
Federal qualified immunity and Maryland constitutional tort immunity are not the same thing.
An officer who successfully invokes qualified immunity against a federal § 1983 claim does not thereby establish immunity from a claim under the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
That distinction can determine whether a constitutional-rights case survives.
Qualified Immunity Applies to Individual Officials
Qualified immunity generally protects individual governmental officials sued for damages under federal law.
It is not Monell immunity.
A municipality sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot invoke the individual officer’s qualified immunity as its own defense to municipal liability.
Likewise, qualified immunity should not be confused with sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, public-official immunity under Maryland common law, statutory immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, or indemnification under the Local Government Tort Claims Act.
These doctrines may arise from the same incident.
They do not mean the same thing.
The first question therefore should always be:
Who is asserting immunity, against which claim, and under what source of law?
The Two Questions in Federal Qualified-Immunity Analysis
Federal qualified-immunity analysis traditionally asks two questions:
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Did the facts alleged or proved establish a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right?
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Was that right clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct?
A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff cannot satisfy the required analysis.
The Supreme Court originally required courts to address the constitutional question first in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
That sequencing rule was later relaxed.
In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the Supreme Court held that courts have discretion to decide which qualified-immunity question to address first.
That procedural change has important consequences.
A Court Can Assume a Constitutional Violation and Still Dismiss the Claim
Suppose a police officer engages in conduct that a court views as constitutionally questionable.
The court does not necessarily have to decide whether the conduct actually violated the Constitution.
It can instead ask whether, at the time of the incident, existing law clearly established that the particular conduct was unconstitutional.
If not, the officer may receive qualified immunity.
Thus, a qualified-immunity decision sometimes effectively says:
Even assuming this violated the Constitution, the officer cannot be held personally liable because the law did not clearly establish the violation at the time.
That distinction is fundamental.
Qualified immunity is not always a determination that the officer acted constitutionally.
What Does “Clearly Established” Mean?
This is where much qualified-immunity litigation occurs.
The plaintiff generally must identify existing legal authority that placed the constitutional question sufficiently beyond debate that a reasonable official would have understood the conduct to be unlawful.
The inquiry cannot ordinarily be conducted at an excessively abstract level.
For example, these propositions are certainly established:
Police officers may not use excessive force.
Government officials may not conduct unreasonable searches.
Correctional officials may not be deliberately indifferent to constitutionally significant risks to prisoners.
But those broad propositions may be insufficient.
The question often becomes whether existing law clearly established that this particular conduct, under sufficiently similar circumstances, violated the Constitution.
The Search for the Right Level of Specificity
Qualified-immunity litigation therefore often becomes a search for precedent.
Assume an officer uses a particular restraint technique on an arrestee.
The plaintiff cites cases establishing that excessive force violates the Fourth Amendment.
The defendant responds that none of those cases involved:
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the same level of resistance;
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the same perceived threat;
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the same restraint;
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the same duration;
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the same warnings;
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the same medical condition; or
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sufficiently comparable surrounding circumstances.
The argument then becomes:
How similar must the earlier case be?
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against defining the right at too high a level of generality.
But the plaintiff does not necessarily need a prior case involving precisely identical facts.
The inquiry is whether existing law gave the official fair warning that the conduct was unconstitutional.
There Is No Requirement for a Case With Identical Facts
Qualified immunity does not mean that the first government official to commit a novel form of obvious constitutional misconduct automatically receives immunity simply because no earlier reported decision involved precisely the same facts.
The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
There, the Court rejected an overly rigid requirement for materially identical precedent and explained that officials can have fair warning even in novel factual circumstances.
In an obvious case, general constitutional principles may clearly establish the unlawfulness of the conduct.
The difficulty lies in determining when the case is sufficiently obvious.
Taylor v. Riojas: Some Conduct Is Obviously Unconstitutional
Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020), provides a modern illustration.
A prisoner alleged that correctional officers confined him in extraordinarily unsanitary cells, including one covered with massive amounts of feces and another in which sewage accumulated on the floor.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the conditions violated the Constitution but nevertheless granted qualified immunity because there was no sufficiently similar precedent.
The Supreme Court reversed.
The conditions were so extreme that no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded they were constitutionally permissible.
The lesson is important:
Specific precedent matters enormously—but obviousness still matters too.
Qualified Immunity Can Be Raised Very Early
Because qualified immunity is intended to protect officials from the burdens of litigation as well as ultimate liability, defendants frequently raise it in a motion to dismiss.
That makes pleading important.
A complaint that merely alleges:
Defendant violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.
says almost nothing.
The complaint should identify facts showing:
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what the defendant personally did;
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what the defendant knew;
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what circumstances confronted the defendant;
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what constitutional right was implicated;
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why the conduct violated that right; and
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why existing law made the violation apparent at the time.
Conclusory constitutional adjectives are particularly vulnerable when qualified immunity is raised before discovery.
Personal Participation Matters
Section 1983 does not ordinarily impose liability merely because someone supervised the wrongdoer.
The plaintiff must establish the defendant’s own legally sufficient connection to the constitutional deprivation.
A complaint naming every person in a chain of command without explaining what each person did invites dismissal.
That issue becomes particularly important in correctional, police-supervision, and institutional cases where many officials may have had different levels of involvement.
For each individual defendant, ask:
What did this person know, what did this person do, and what constitutional duty did this person’s own conduct violate?
Qualified Immunity at Summary Judgment
Even if a plaintiff survives dismissal, qualified immunity may return at summary judgment.
At that point, the question is no longer confined to the allegations.
The evidentiary record matters.
Body-camera footage, surveillance video, dispatch recordings, medical records, policies, training materials, deposition testimony, contemporaneous reports, electronic communications, and other evidence may establish—or undermine—the factual basis for qualified immunity.
The court must apply the appropriate summary-judgment standards while deciding the legal immunity question.
Disputed material facts can therefore matter greatly.
Video Evidence Can Change the Analysis
Civil-rights litigation increasingly involves video.
In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court held that a court deciding summary judgment need not accept a version of events that is blatantly contradicted by an unambiguous video record.
That principle can be enormously important in police cases.
A complaint may describe an unresisting suspect.
The officer may describe a violent struggle.
Body-camera footage may resolve—or complicate—the dispute.
Counsel should obtain and preserve video evidence as early as possible.
Qualified Immunity Can Interrupt the Case Before Trial
One of the most consequential features of federal qualified immunity is appellate.
A denial of qualified immunity can, in appropriate circumstances, be immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
That means the case may stop before trial while the appellate court reviews the immunity ruling.
But there is an important distinction.
An interlocutory appellate court generally has jurisdiction to review a legal qualified-immunity issue.
It ordinarily does not have interlocutory jurisdiction merely to reconsider the district court’s determination that genuine factual disputes exist.
The distinction between:
“Even accepting the plaintiff’s facts, I am entitled to immunity,”
and
“The plaintiff’s facts are not true,”
can therefore determine whether an immediate appeal is available.
Johnson v. Jones: Factual Disputes Matter
In Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), the Supreme Court limited interlocutory appellate jurisdiction where the dispute concerns whether the summary-judgment record contains sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual issue.
That distinction remains important.
Qualified immunity creates an unusual procedural environment in which lawyers must constantly separate:
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constitutional law;
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clearly established law;
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evidentiary sufficiency; and
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appellate jurisdiction.
Discovery May Be Delayed or Limited
Because qualified immunity is intended to protect officials from litigation burdens, courts may address the immunity issue before permitting broad discovery.
This can create a difficult problem for plaintiffs.
The plaintiff may need discovery to determine what an officer knew or why the officer acted.
The defendant may argue that qualified immunity entitles the officer to avoid discovery until immunity is resolved.
The pleading therefore assumes particular importance in federal civil-rights litigation.
The more facts that can responsibly be developed before filing, the better positioned the plaintiff may be to withstand an early immunity challenge.
Police Cases: Reasonableness and Clearly Established Law
Qualified immunity frequently arises in excessive-force cases.
The underlying Fourth Amendment question ordinarily examines objective reasonableness under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Factors include:
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the severity of the suspected offense;
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whether the suspect posed an immediate threat;
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whether the suspect was actively resisting;
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whether the suspect was attempting to flee; and
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the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer.
Qualified immunity then adds another question:
Even if the force was constitutionally excessive, was its unlawfulness clearly established under the circumstances confronting the officer?
Those are separate inquiries.
Correctional Cases: The Constitutional Standard Comes First
Qualified immunity in correctional litigation can be especially complicated because the underlying constitutional standard depends upon the plaintiff’s status and the particular right asserted.
A sentenced prisoner historically proceeds under Eighth Amendment principles.
A pretrial detainee’s claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Supreme Court decisions have altered the analysis for certain detainee claims.
Before researching qualified immunity, counsel therefore must identify the correct substantive constitutional standard.
Otherwise, the “clearly established” inquiry begins with the wrong constitutional rule.
Gelin v. Baltimore County: Sometimes the Case Ends at the First Question
Gelin v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 132 F.4th 700 (4th Cir. 2025), illustrates another point.
Ashleigh Gelin died by suicide while serving a sentence at the Baltimore County Detention Center.
The allegations included failures by correctional personnel to conduct required watch-tour rounds and failures to respond while inmates attempted to summon assistance.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the allegations did not adequately establish the subjective knowledge and deliberate disregard required for the federal Eighth Amendment claim against the officers.
That meant the court did not need qualified immunity to save an otherwise valid constitutional claim.
The constitutional claim itself failed.
This distinction matters.
Lawyers sometimes describe every successful defense in a § 1983 case as “qualified immunity.”
But there are two very different possibilities:
No constitutional violation has been adequately alleged or proved.
or:
A constitutional violation occurred, but qualified immunity protects the individual defendant because the right was not clearly established.
Those holdings are not interchangeable.
Why the Distinction Matters Beyond the Federal Claim
Suppose the court holds that no constitutional violation occurred.
That determination may have consequences for parallel constitutional theories.
Now suppose instead that the court assumes a constitutional violation but grants the officer qualified immunity because the federal right was not clearly established.
That does not necessarily resolve a Maryland constitutional claim arising from the same conduct.
The reason is fundamental:
Maryland does not simply import federal qualified immunity into its constitutional tort law.
Maryland Constitutional Torts Are Different
Maryland recognizes direct damages actions for violations of provisions of its Declaration of Rights.
Important cases include Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995); DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 729 A.2d 354 (1999); Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 757 A.2d 118 (2000); and Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859 (2011).
Maryland has repeatedly declined simply to make its constitutional tort remedies identical to § 1983.
That is especially important when immunity is involved.
Okwa v. Harper: No Public-Official Qualified Immunity for Maryland Constitutional Torts
Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 757 A.2d 118 (2000), involved allegations of excessive force and other misconduct at Baltimore-Washington International Airport.
The Supreme Court of Maryland made the principle clear:
Maryland public-official immunity does not shield an official from liability for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Thus, a Maryland constitutional claim is not defeated merely because the defendant might have common-law public-official immunity from an ordinary negligence claim.
And the federal doctrine of qualified immunity does not simply migrate into the Maryland constitutional count.
DiPino v. Davis: Maryland’s Remedy Is Its Own
DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 729 A.2d 354 (1999), likewise emphasizes that Maryland constitutional tort law developed independently from § 1983’s remedial restrictions.
This becomes extremely important when federal and Maryland constitutional claims arise from identical conduct.
The federal count may encounter qualified immunity.
The Maryland constitutional count requires its own analysis.
A lawyer should never assume:
Federal qualified immunity granted = Maryland constitutional claim dismissed.
The reasons for the federal decision must be examined.
Longtin: Maryland Did Not Adopt the Federal Remedial Model
Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859 (2011), further illustrates Maryland’s independent approach.
Maryland recognizes local-government liability for constitutional torts under principles materially different from Monell, including respondeat superior in appropriate circumstances and direct liability for an unconstitutional pattern or practice.
That produces a striking contrast.
Federal law may provide:
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qualified immunity for an individual official; and
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no respondeat superior liability against the municipality under § 1983.
Maryland law may simultaneously provide:
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no comparable public-official qualified immunity for the Maryland constitutional tort; and
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potential local-government responsibility for the employee’s Maryland constitutional violation.
The same incident can therefore produce very different liability analyses depending upon which constitutional claim is being examined.
Qualified Immunity Does Not Protect Municipalities Under § 1983
This point deserves separate emphasis.
A municipality cannot avoid Monell liability merely because its employee receives qualified immunity.
But the reason the officer received immunity can matter.
If the officer receives qualified immunity because the court concludes there was no constitutional violation, the municipal claim may fail because there is no underlying constitutional wrong to attribute to municipal policy.
If the officer receives qualified immunity because a constitutional right existed but was not clearly established, municipal liability presents a different question.
Municipalities do not themselves receive qualified immunity.
Thus, counsel must read the precise holding rather than simply noting that the officer “won qualified immunity.”
Public-Official Immunity Is Not Qualified Immunity
Maryland common-law public-official immunity is another doctrine entirely.
It generally concerns qualifying public officials performing discretionary acts without malice.
Its application depends upon Maryland law and the particular cause of action.
It should not be confused with:
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federal qualified immunity;
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governmental immunity;
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sovereign immunity;
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MTCA statutory immunity;
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LGTCA indemnification; or
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Maryland constitutional tort principles.
A complaint involving governmental employees may implicate several of these doctrines simultaneously.
Using the word “immunity” without identifying which immunity is being discussed invites error.
MTCA Immunity Is Different Again
State personnel may have statutory immunity under Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-522(b) for tortious acts within the scope of their public duties when performed without malice or gross negligence.
That is not federal qualified immunity.
Its exceptions are different.
Its relationship to the State’s liability is different.
And the questions of gross negligence and malice under Maryland statutory immunity should not be confused with the federal question of whether a constitutional right was clearly established.
The LGTCA Is Not Qualified Immunity Either
The Local Government Tort Claims Act creates still another framework.
Among other things, it addresses local-government responsibility for judgments against employees acting within the scope of employment.
It does not simply confer federal-style qualified immunity upon local employees.
Thus, when a county officer says “I have immunity,” the lawyer should immediately ask:
Which immunity?
The answer may determine the entire case.
A Practical Example
Assume a county police officer arrests a person without probable cause.
The plaintiff alleges both:
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a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983; and
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an Article 26 claim under the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The federal court concludes that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment but that existing federal precedent did not clearly establish the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct under the particular circumstances.
The officer receives qualified immunity from the § 1983 damages claim.
That does not automatically dispose of the Article 26 claim.
The Maryland constitutional claim must be analyzed under Maryland law, including Maryland’s own remedial and immunity principles.
Now change the hypothetical.
Suppose the court instead concludes that probable cause actually existed and therefore there was no unconstitutional seizure.
That ruling presents a very different problem for the Article 26 claim because Articles 26 and Fourth Amendment protections are often interpreted in pari materia.
The precise reason for the federal ruling therefore matters enormously.
Plead the Maryland Claim Separately
Where the facts and law support both federal and Maryland constitutional claims, they should be pleaded as distinct causes of action.
Do not write one constitutional count alleging violation of “the Fourth Amendment and Article 26” and assume the court will sort out the remedial differences.
Identify:
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the federal right;
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the § 1983 cause of action;
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the Maryland constitutional provision;
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the Maryland constitutional tort;
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the defendants against whom each claim is asserted; and
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the factual basis supporting each theory.
The claims may arise from the same conduct.
They do not necessarily have the same defenses.
Do Not Plead “Clearly Established” as a Slogan
The phrase “clearly established” is not magic language.
A complaint that repeatedly alleges that the defendant violated “clearly established law” without describing the underlying conduct gains little from the repetition.
The facts matter.
The strongest pleading explains why the conduct, viewed in context, violated a constitutional rule that was already sufficiently apparent when the defendant acted.
The legal research supporting that proposition should begin before the complaint is filed.
Research Qualified Immunity Before Filing
In a serious federal constitutional case, counsel should perform the clearly-established-law research during case evaluation.
Do not wait for the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Search decisions from:
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the United States Supreme Court;
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the Fourth Circuit;
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and other authority relevant under governing qualified-immunity doctrine.
Look for fact patterns sufficiently close to the anticipated evidence.
Also look for cases distinguishing the defendant’s likely authorities.
The question is not merely:
Can I prove a constitutional violation?
It is:
Can I prove a constitutional violation for which this defendant may be held personally liable under the law existing when the event occurred?
The Date of the Incident Matters
Qualified immunity examines the law as it existed when the defendant acted.
A later appellate decision announcing or clarifying a constitutional rule may help future plaintiffs while doing nothing for a plaintiff whose injury occurred before the rule became clearly established.
Every qualified-immunity research project therefore requires a cutoff date:
What law existed on the date of this incident?
Later cases may help explain earlier precedent, but they cannot simply be projected backward as though the official had access to future law.
Discovery Should Target the Constitutional Elements Too
Because qualified immunity is often described as an objective doctrine, lawyers sometimes underappreciate evidence concerning the defendant’s knowledge.
Whether subjective knowledge matters depends upon the underlying constitutional right.
In deliberate-indifference litigation, for example, the official’s knowledge may be central to whether a constitutional violation occurred in the first place.
Relevant discovery may include:
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training;
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prior warnings;
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policies;
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incident reports;
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medical records;
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shift logs;
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watch-tour records;
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radio communications;
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body-camera footage;
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surveillance video;
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emails and text messages;
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deposition testimony; and
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evidence of what information was actually communicated to the defendant.
Qualified immunity does not eliminate the need to prove the underlying constitutional claim.
Qualified Immunity Can Determine Settlement Dynamics
The doctrine also affects settlement.
A plaintiff may have devastating injuries and compelling evidence of misconduct but face a substantial qualified-immunity question.
Conversely, a defendant may face uncertain clearly-established-law arguments while Maryland constitutional claims remain viable regardless of the federal immunity defense.
The parties therefore should value the entire case rather than treating the federal qualified-immunity motion as though it necessarily determines every claim.
This is particularly important where the governmental employer may ultimately be responsible for payment under state law.
Do Not Let the Federal Claim Eclipse the Maryland Case
In Maryland civil-rights litigation, § 1983 often receives most of the attention.
That is understandable. It is a powerful federal remedy supported by an enormous body of case law and the potential for attorney’s fees under § 1988.
But the federal claim should not cause counsel to overlook Maryland constitutional law.
A plaintiff can lose a federal claim because of qualified immunity while retaining a potentially viable Maryland constitutional claim.
A plaintiff can also lose both claims because the underlying conduct was constitutional.
Those are fundamentally different outcomes.
Bottom Line
Qualified immunity is powerful, but it is frequently misunderstood.
It does not mean that government officials cannot be sued.
It does not mean that every official who acted in good faith is immune.
It does not mean that a court granting qualified immunity necessarily found the conduct constitutional.
And it does not mean that a parallel Maryland constitutional claim automatically disappears.
The proper analysis asks:
Was there a federal constitutional violation?
Was the federal right clearly established when the conduct occurred?
Why did the court grant or deny qualified immunity?
Does the same conduct violate the Maryland Declaration of Rights?
What Maryland immunity doctrines actually apply to that claim?
Is the governmental employer independently or derivatively liable?
And what claims remain even if the individual defendant receives federal qualified immunity?
For Maryland practitioners, the last questions can be just as important as the first.
Federal qualified immunity may end a § 1983 claim against an individual official.
It does not necessarily end the constitutional case.
Related Maryland Cases and Authorities
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Gelin v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 132 F.4th 700 (4th Cir. 2025) — illustrates the distinction between failure to establish an underlying constitutional violation and qualified immunity; addresses constitutional claims arising from a jail suicide and the deliberate-indifference standard.
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Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859 (2011) — confirms important differences between Maryland constitutional tort remedies and federal § 1983 doctrine, including local-government liability.
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Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 757 A.2d 118 (2000) — Maryland public-official immunity does not shield officials from liability for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
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DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 729 A.2d 354 (1999) — foundational Maryland constitutional-tort decision explaining Maryland’s independent remedial approach and governmental responsibility for state constitutional violations.
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Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995) — important Maryland constitutional-tort authority concerning governmental liability and direct constitutional remedies.
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Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988) — foundational Maryland authority concerning constitutional tort liability and governmental immunity.
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Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 863 A.2d 297 (2004) — discusses Maryland public-official immunity and confirms the distinct treatment of Maryland constitutional tort claims.
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Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) — permits courts discretion in deciding which prong of the federal qualified-immunity analysis to address first.
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Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) — established the two-step constitutional-violation/clearly-established-right framework later made nonmandatory in sequence by Pearson.
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Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) — rejects a rigid requirement for factually identical precedent and explains the concept of fair warning.
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Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020) — illustrates the principle that sufficiently obvious unconstitutional conduct can defeat qualified immunity despite the absence of a prior case involving identical facts.
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Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) — addresses summary judgment where video evidence blatantly contradicts a party’s factual account.
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Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) — limits interlocutory appellate review where the qualified-immunity dispute concerns evidentiary sufficiency rather than a purely legal question.
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Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) — establishes the Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness framework for excessive-force claims arising from seizures.
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Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) — establishes federal municipal liability under § 1983 while rejecting respondeat superior municipal liability.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 — federal civil cause of action for deprivation of constitutional and federal statutory rights under color of state law.
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42 U.S.C. § 1988 — provides for attorney’s fees in qualifying federal civil-rights litigation.
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Maryland Declaration of Rights, Articles 24 and 26 — frequently implicated Maryland constitutional protections in governmental misconduct litigation.
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Md. Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings § 5-522 — statutory immunity provisions applicable to qualifying State personnel under the Maryland Tort Claims Act.
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Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act, Md. Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings §§ 5-301 through 5-304 — governs important aspects of local-government tort litigation and indemnification but should not be confused with federal qualified immunity.